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Abstract: Two of the most important documents for ensuring the effective deployment of 
information systems and technologies within the modern business enterprise are the 
strategic information systems plan [SISP] and the information security policy. The strategic 
information systems plan ensures that new systems and technologies are deployed in a way 
that will support an organisation’s strategic goals whilst the information security policy 
provides a framework to ensure that systems are developed and operated in a secure 
manner. To date, the literature with regard to the formulation of the information security 
policy has tended to ignore its important relationship with the strategic information systems 
plan, and vice versa. In this paper we argue that these two important policy documents 
should be explicitly and carefully aligned to ensure that the outcomes of strategically 
important information system initiatives are not compromised by problems with their security. 
 
Key Words: Strategic Information systems planning; information security policy; security 
breaches; alignment 
 
1 Introduction 
For the past two decades it has been argued that an ‘information revolution’ is taking place 
that is having a significant impact upon all aspects of organisational life [e.g. Porter & Millar, 
1985; Drucker, 1988]. Indeed, it is often contended that information is now analogous to an 
organisation’s lifeblood: should the flow of information become seriously restricted or 
compromised  then the organisation may wither and die. However, if applied effectively as a 
strategic resource, information investments can result in the realisation of significant 
corporate benefits. As McPherson [1996] argues, ‘information is vital to the success of the 
business and will be accountable for a significant share of the business’s various indicators 
of success, including its cash flow and market value’. However, such benefits will not be 
realised from the utilisation of information if the associated information systems and 
technologies are applied in an unfocussed and piecemeal way. As Lederer & Sethi [1996] 
note, strategic information systems planning [SISP] plays a vital role in helping to avoid 'lost 
opportunities, duplicated effort, incompatible systems, and wasted resources'. Looked at in a 
different way, the process of formulating an information systems’ plan helps to explicitly focus 
the planners' attention on ‘major opportunities for exploiting information’ [Ward and Peppard, 
2002: 468]. 
 
Whilst a key objective of strategic information systems planning is to identify opportunities to 
exploit information, Ward and Peppard [2002: 468] also note that the real ‘challenge is to 
ensure that this information is of the highest quality possible, particularly in terms of 
timeliness, accuracy, completeness, confidence in source, reliability and appropriateness’. 
Unfortunately, in practice, many organisations are failing to consistently provide the high 
quality information resources that their managers require, because of unacceptably high 
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levels of security breaches experienced [Garg et al, 2003]. For example, in the UK, it has 
recently been found that ‘the number of security incidents continues to rise’, with 74% of 
businesses reporting a security breach in 2004, as compared with only 44% in 2000 [DTI, 
2004; p.1]. In a similar vein, Austin & Darby [2003; p. 121] note that in the United States 
'security breaches affect 90% of all businesses every year, and cost some $17 billion'. 
Moreover, Austin & Darby [2003] also suggest that protective measures can be very 
expensive: 'the average company can easily spend 5% to 10% of its IT budget on security'. 
One important mechanism for protecting corporate information, in an attempt to detect, 
prevent and respond to security breaches is through the formulation and application of an 
information security policy (InSPy) [Hone & Eloff, 2002; von Solms & von Solms, 2004].  
 
There is therefore an obvious relationship between strategic information systems planning 
and information security management, and hence between the two key documents 
associated with these activities: the strategic information systems plan and the information 
security policy.  The former document is designed to identify what information resources are 
required and how they can be exploited, whilst the latter details how such information can be 
kept secure and therefore readily available to managers. For example, if a strategic 
information systems plan were to identify the need for an enterprise-wide intranet, then the 
information security policy would need to be modified to take account of this highly significant 
change to the way in which corporate information is to be stored, disseminated and 
managed.  
 
Higgins [1999] argues that the information security ‘policy is the start of security 
management. Whilst supporting this sentiment, we would add the caveat that the strategic 
information systems plan is a critical pre-requisite for policy formulation, as it defines the 
business context in which information security will be managed and therefore the objectives 
of, and priorities for, security management. Unfortunately, whilst the relationship between 
these two key business documents appears clear, a thorough review of the literature 
suggests that this subject has been given little explicit coverage in academic or practitioner 
publications. Consequently, the broad aim of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature by 
exploring how and why the information security policy should be explicitly aligned with the 
strategic information systems plan. To explore the issue, the remainder of the paper has 
been organised into a further four sections. Section two reviews the relevant literature, before 
some common business cases are used to investigate in more detail the nature of the 
relationship, between SISP and the InSPy, in the third section. In the final sections, we 
review the implications of our findings in the context of the literature.  
 
2 The relationship between the Information Security Policy 
and the Strategic Information Systems Plan  
The purpose of this section is to review the aims and scope of the strategic information 
systems plan and then the information security policy, before exploring how the two might be 
directly related. 
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2.1 The Role and Scope of the Strategic Information Systems Plan 
As concerns continue to grow about the value and effectiveness of IT investments, improving 
strategic information systems planning practices has rapidly become one of the most critical 
issues facing IS executives today [Galliers 1993 Segars et al, 1998a; Newkirk et al, 2003]. 
Strategic information systems planning (SISP) has been defined as: ‘the process of 
identifying a portfolio of computer-based applications to be implemented, which is both highly 
aligned with corporate strategy and has the ability to create an advantage over competitors.’ 
[Doherty et al, 1999]. It is, therefore, an exercise, or ongoing activity, that enables 
organisations to develop priorities for IS development. Specific projects are chosen for their 
alignment with business objectives or their capacity to create significant impact on the 
organisation’s competitive positioning. Whilst the main focus of SISP – as witnessed by the 
above definition – is typically viewed as the identification of new applications, Beynon-Davies 
[2000; p. 417] suggests that a SISP exercise may cover a wider variety of projects. More 
specifically, he suggests that SISP facilitates the identification of a prioritised portfolio of the 
following types of system and technology related projects: 
 Corrections to existing information systems; 
 Enhancements to existing information systems; 
 Major new information systems development projects; 
 Major new infrastructure systems or technologies, for example those that attempt to 
integrate systems across the organisation; 
 Research projects investigating innovative and potentially rewarding systems and 
technologies. 
 
The implementation of any of the above types of project in a portfolio can have significant 
implications for the security of corporate information resources, and consequentially the 
organisation’s information security policy. We would, therefore, argue that the output of the 
strategic information planning process – a comprehensive, fully costed and timetabled plan – 
should be used to test the adequacy of the current InSPy, if one already exists, or to provide 
focus for the creation of an initial policy, if it does not exist. A fuller discussion of the process 
of information systems planning, and how the review of the information security policy might 
usefully be incorporated, is presented in section 2.3. 
 
2.2 The Role and Scope of the Information Security Policy 
Gaston [1996; p 175] suggests that the information security policy can be defined as the 
'broad guiding statements of goals to be achieved’ with regard to the security of corporate 
information resources. This definition is broadly in line with the International Standard on 
'Information Security Management' [ISO 17799, 2000; p. 1], which suggests that the InSPy 
document should 'provide management direction and support for information security'. As 
such, InSPys typically include 'general statements of goals, objectives, beliefs ethics and 
responsibilities, often accompanied by the general means of achieving these things (such as 
procedures)' [Wood, 1995].  The information security policy has become the focus of an 
increasing amount of academic scrutiny, over the past ten years or so, as its critical role in 
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preventing, detecting and responding to security breaches has become more apparent. The 
aim of this section is to provide a review of this body of literature, paying particular attention 
to the importance and scope of such policies.  
 
There is a growing consensus both within the academic and practitioner communities that 
the information security policy is the basis for the dissemination and enforcement of sound 
security practices, within the organisational context [e.g. Baskerville & Siponen, 2002; 
Doherty & Fulford, 2005]. As David [2002] notes: 'it is well known, at least among true 
security professionals, that formal policy is a prerequisite of security'. Similarly, Lindup [1995] 
asserts:  
 
'ten years ago, information security policies were more or less unheard of outside the 
world of secret military and government networks. Now they are regarded by security 
professionals as one of the most important foundations of information security' 
 
The primary reason that the InSPy has become the 'prerequisite' or 'foundation' of effective 
security practices has been suggested by Higgins [1999], who notes: ‘without a policy, 
security practices will be developed without clear demarcation of objectives and 
responsibilities’.  
 
Whilst a great deal has been written about the importance and role of the information security 
policy, and approaches to its formulation and dissemination, there is relatively little academic 
material that explicitly addresses the scope or content of security policies. One recent 
attempt to explicitly fill this gap synthesised the key themes from the literature - in particular 
the international standard [ISO 17799, 2000] - into a list of specific issues to be addressed by 
the information security policy. This provisional list was then validated through an empirical 
study of the use of the InSPy, within large UK-based organizations [Fulford & Doherty, 2003]. 
Given that these issues will form the framework for analysing our case examples, in section 
3, we have provided the following working descriptions for each of these individual 
components of the information security policy: 
1. Personal usage of information systems: The information security policy should 
clearly articulate the individual employee’s rights and responsibilities in their use of 
organisational information systems. 
2. Disclosure of information: Information systems increasingly allow employees direct 
access to significant amounts of information – much of which may be confidential. The 
security policy must therefore highlight any restrictions with regard to the disclosure or 
use of such information. 
3. Physical security of infrastructure and information resources: It has been noted 
that ‘equipment should be physically protected from security threats and environmental 
hazards’ [ISO 17799, 2000; p. 16]. It is, therefore, important that the policy explicitly 
articulates how infrastructure and information resources are to be protected. 
4. Violations and breaches of security: As noted in the introduction to this paper 
security breaches are still a common, and potentially very damaging, occurrence. The 
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policy document must therefore indicate the steps to be taken to recover from a breach 
or violation and the requirements for recording such security incidents [ISO 17799, 
2000; p. 16]. 
5. Prevention of viruses and worms: The rapid proliferation of viruses, worms and 
trojans present an increasingly potent threat to the security of corporate information 
resources [Post & Kagan, 2000; Hinde, 2002]. The organisation’s policy with regard to 
the application of virus checking software, the use of attachments and the sharing of 
information must therefore be made clear. 
6. User access management: It has been noted that ‘access to information and 
business processes should be controlled on the basis of business and security 
requirements’ [ISO 17799, 2000; p. 33].The information security policy should, 
therefore, provide a ‘clear statement of the business requirements to be met by access 
controls’ [ISO 17799, 2000; p. 33].  
7. Mobile computing: The use of notebooks, palmtops and laptops away from the 
traditional working environment makes them particularly vulnerable, as they are more 
difficult to protect using conventional security controls. The policy must therefore 
highlight the practices that must be adopted to ensure that ‘business information is not 
compromised’ [ISO 17799, 2000; p. 46]. 
8. Internet access: As the use of the Internet - in the workplace – continues to grow 
rapidly, it is important that the policy explicitly addresses the issue of Internet access, 
particularly with respect to issues such as the viewing of pornography and personal 
browsing. 
9. Software development and maintenance: As many security problems can be directly 
attributed to errors and oversights in the development of information systems, the 
policy must present guidelines for ensuring that effective security controls and 
procedures are built into all new systems.  
10. Encryption: The growth of electronic commerce and mobile computing has inevitably 
increased the amount of information that is being communicated across public - and 
potentially less secure – networks. The organisation’s requirements for the encrypting 
of such information must therefore be clearly addressed in the information security 
policy. 
11. Contingency / continuity planning: It is essential that all organisations have a 
contingency plan in place to specify how to cope with and recover from a significant 
security breach, such as a natural disaster or a serious virus. The information security 
policy must specify how such contingency plans are to be written, tested, maintained, 
and ultimately implemented. 
 
The above review has attempted to identify and describe the issues that will commonly be 
addressed in the information security policy. However, it cannot claim to be either a definitive 
or generic list, as the range of issues to be covered in a specific policy will very much depend 
upon the host organisation's particular circumstances and security priorities. It is likely that 
any significant modification to an organisation’s IT infrastructure and applications – 
engendered by a new information systems plan - will have an impact on the majority, if not all 
of the above issues. 
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2.3 The Relationship between the Information Security Policy and the Strategic 
Information Systems Plan 
A review of the literature suggests that researchers and practitioners are beginning to 
recognise that the information security policy should relate in some way to corporate 
objectives. For example, the International Standard [ISO 17799, 2000; p. xi] suggests that 
the ‘security policy should reflect business objectives’. However, the standard goes on to 
suggest that a review of the information security policy should take place 'in response to any 
changes affecting the basis of the original risk assessment, e.g. significant security incidents, 
new vulnerabilities or changes to the organizational or technical infrastructures’ (ISO 17799, 
2000, p. 2).  Consequently, the Standard appears to emphasise a reactive form of policy 
review, and it certainly offers no explicit advice on how the policy might best be aligned with 
corporate objectives. Zuccato [2004; p. 67] also suggests that the point of departure for the 
preparation of a security requirements model is the specification of a vision and goals, but he 
does not specify whether this is the organizational vision and goals, or the vision and goals of 
the modelling exercise. Whilst Baskerville and Siponen [2002] recognise that information 
security policies should be ‘approved by a steering committee of managers, which may 
include specialists in information security, design and development and strategic planning1’, 
they make no explicit link between the information security policy and corporate objectives. 
 
In summary, whilst there have been isolated calls in the literature for a link between 
corporate objectives / strategic planning and the formulation of the information security 
policy, there has been no focussed discussion of how this link might be established and 
operationalised. One obvious approach – that to the best of our knowledge has not been 
addressed in either the academic or practitioner literatures - would be to closely and explicitly 
align the information security policy with the strategic information systems plan, which in turn 
should be based upon corporate objectives.  
 
Figure 1 presents a highly summarised view of how the process of reviewing the information 
security policy might be accommodated within the strategic information systems planning 
process. In figure 1a, we see the traditional process by which the strategic information 
systems’ plan is formulated: an appropriate planning team is assembled, the situation 
analysis is conducted and a strategy is formulated and then implemented. Having 
implemented the new strategic plan, it will be periodically reviewed and modified to ensure 
that it is pertinent to the organisation’s changing needs. In Figure 1b this traditional process 
for formulating the IS plan has been modified to accommodate the information security 
policy2. In this case, once the new strategy has been formulated, its impact on the 
information security policy will be reviewed – and if necessary the security policy will be 
modified – prior to the implementation of the strategy. Similarly, when reviewing a new 
strategy, once it is operational, the impact of any changes on the information security policy 
will be reviewed, before implementing any changes to the strategy. 
                                                 
1  Our emphasis 
2  There is an underlying assumption in our basic model that the organisation already has an information 
security policy. However, for those organisations that do not, the process of formulating a new IS plan should 
act as a stimulus for developing an initial information security policy. 
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As the ‘review / modify information security policy’ phase, on the revised version of the SISP, 
is probably the most important, in the context of this paper, it warrants some further 
explanation. It is envisaged that this activity should be operationalized by firstly assembling a 
group of appropriate personnel – IT, information security, strategic planning and commercial 
specialists – to review the security implications of the strategy. More specifically, this group 
should assess the ways in which each individual IT project - documented in the SISP – might 
be used and abused, once operational, and consequently how each might threaten the 
security of the organizations’ information resources. Having generated a list of potential 
security threats, in terms of both their likelihood and significance, the existing information 
security policy must then be critically reviewed to assess whether each of these potential 
threats is adequately countered by the existing policy. If it is not, then each of the inadequate 
components must be modified to effectively counter the newly identified threat. Whilst the key 
focus of this exercise will be the alignment of the strategic information systems plan, and the 
InSPy, it is recommended that the corporate objectives are also considered, in case there 
are any changes to the wider corporate strategy that might impact upon information security, 
even if these haven’t been reflected in the SISP. For example, a strategic drive to increase 
the number of customers using an organizations web-site might not warrant any explicit 
changes to the organizations IS / IT provision, but it might have indirect implications for 
information security. 
 
In situations where a policy is not currently in use, this explicit link between SISP and 
information security, will not only help to get information security on senior managers’ 
agendas, it will also act as a very strong cue for organizations to formulate an initial policy . 
Indeed, this eventuality is highly likely, as recent findings with respect to the uptake of 
information security policies within the UK suggest that nearly two thirds of all companies are 
still failing to implement a policy [DTI, 2004]. Even amongst larger organisations [250+ 
employees], the level of uptake is still a potential cause of concern [DTI, 2004; Fulford & 
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Doherty, 2003]. The most likely explanation for this low level of adoption is that information 
security is simply not ‘high on the agenda of those at board level’ [May, 2003; p. 13]. 
 
It could be argued that the review of the information security policy does not need to be so 
explicitly integrated into the SISP formulation process, as there is likely to be a significant 
time-lag between the formulation of a new strategic IS plan, and any resulting implications for 
the management of information security. However, we believe that this proactive approach 
can be defended on the grounds that there may be instances where the introduction of a new 
strategy will have such a significant impact on the management of information security that it 
will require changes to the strategy before it is implemented. For example, a new strategy in 
support of the introduction of an enterprise-wide intranet might have such significant 
implications for information security, that it warrants the introduction of a completely new IT 
infrastructure, which will, in turn, require a significant change to the new strategy to 
accommodate this. In extreme cases, it could even be that the implications of a new strategic 
initiative are so potentially dangerous, that the strategy has to be shelved. For example, 
concerns about ensuring the security of on-line transactions might dissuade a retailer from 
developing a web-based ordering facility. Whilst we have argued strongly that the InSPy 
should be reviewed and updated, in a proactive manner, as an integral part of the strategic 
information systems planning process, we also recognise that there will still be 
circumstances where the InSPy will need to be modified in response to a given set of 
circumstances. For example, if an organisation’s information security procedures have been 
seriously compromised by hackers or viruses, then it may be necessary to immediately 
modify the policy to reduce the likelihood of repeat occurrences. 
 
3 Case Examples 
The aim of this section is to explore how the strategic information systems plans for some 
common types of information systems and technology implementation projects might affect 
the information security policy of a large manufacturing organization3.  For each of these 
hypothetical projects, the broad strategic objectives of the initiative will be explored, before 
the implication of each for the formulation of the InSPy is investigated, and in some cases 
vice versa.  The projects outlined range from relatively simple introductions of new hardware 
or software to a small section of an organisation, through to more complex systems initiatives 
that are likely to have a considerable impact on working practices across the organization as 
a whole, as well as on the organization's trading partners (suppliers and customers).  
 
3.1 Example 1: Introduction of Internet access to the R&D department 
Organizations are increasingly using the Internet for information retrieval purposes, rather 
than relying on more conventional paper-based information repositories (DTI 2004).  The 
introduction of Internet access to the R&D department of a manufacturing organization 
would, for example, permit rapid and extensive competitor analysis, and product 
comparisons.  However, as it is typically difficult to restrict Internet usage to very narrowly 
                                                 
3  A manufacturing context was explicitly chosen, as manufacturers typically invest in a wide range of often 
highly sophisticated systems, that can have very significant security implications. 
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defined domains, its use, and indeed abuse, can have significant security implications. For 
example, users may download insecure data and files, view illegal material (e.g. 
pornography), or simply waste time of non productive activities. Consequently, those areas of 
the policy relating to personal IT usage and Internet access will require particularly close 
scrutiny, as the potential security impacts are likely to be most significant in these areas.  
 
3.2 Example 2: Introduction of laptops to the sales team 
The use of mobile computing facilities, such as laptops, has been a boon for many 
organizations, allowing their staff to keep in touch with the office whilst off-site, and also 
giving them remote access to corporate facilities, such as product databases, whilst visiting 
clients, attending trade fairs, and so on.  However, the introduction of laptops and other 
mobile computing devices has a number of major security implications (Ahlberg 2004).  For 
example, there is the problem of physical security: the equipment is more vulnerable to theft 
and damage while staff are away from their office base.  There is also the issue of remote 
access to corporate data resources, which can be vulnerable to attacks form outside as the 
networks are not likely to be as secure as those used within the organization itself.  Indeed, a 
recent survey (Ahlberg 2004) showed that a third of users do not even use simple password 
protection facilities on their mobile computing devices, whilst two thirds of mobile computing 
users did not have their data encrypted.  Moreover, as with the previous example, there are 
likely to be concerns with regard to users’ personal use of organizational systems and 
remote access to the Internet. However, in the case of mobile computing, these concerns 
may be exacerbated, as staff are away from the normal in-house controls and monitoring 
regimes. Problems of disclosing information may also be more likely, in situations where 
users are working off-site, often in close proximity to trading partners. Again, all those areas 
of the information security policy dealing with these specific security threats will need to be 
thoroughly reviewed, and where necessary modified, particularly personal usage, mobile 
computing and Internet access, where the impacts of mobile computing are likely to be most 
significant.   
 
3.3 Example 3: ERP implementation 
An enterprise resource planning [ERP] system is a software package with integrated 
modules that support all major business functions across an organisation. ERP systems 
have become increasingly popular amongst many commercial organisations, particularly 
those operating in the manufacturing sector, where they can deliver many benefits (Spathis 
and Constantinides 2003).  It is very likely that the adoption of an ERP system, within a 
manufacturing organization, would have significant implications for the management of 
corporate information, and in particular the safeguarding of its security. In addition to those 
security areas already discussed under the first two examples, the organization is likely to 
review areas associated with information disclosure, as the ERP will make information more 
widely available to different types of user across the organization.  Moreover, the 
organization may need to establish more comprehensive contingency plans, as an ERP is 
likely to make the organization more dependent on its IT resources.  Encryption rules will 
need to be thoroughly reviewed if the organization is intending to use the ERP to link via 
electronic networks to suppliers and customers.  The latest DTI security breaches survey 
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report notes, for example, that 'greater connectivity' has increased the 'exposure of UK 
businesses to security threats' (DTI 2004).   
 
In the case of a strategic initiative such as ERP implementation, it is arguably not just the 
impact of the strategic initiative on the security policy that needs to be reviewed.  There may 
also be cases where it will be necessary to amend the strategic information systems plan, to 
avoid high risk security problems. For example, most ERP systems are acquired in packaged 
form, with a wide variety of security controls built in.  The organization will need to consider 
whether such predefined controls are stringent enough for their purposes, and whether they 
match the sorts of controls documented in their existing policy.  It may be that the 
organization decides, at the planning and systems development stage, that certain 
components of the ERP package are not sufficiently secure for their purposes, and they may 
decide, therefore, not to implement those components, and perhaps instead to develop their 
own bespoke components or systems.   
 
3.4 Example 4: E-commerce initiative 
Through its high levels of connectivity, reach and adoption, the Internet, has probably 
become the most influential of the vast array of technologies available to businesses. For 
manufacturing organizations it has provided an unprecedented opportunity for selling 
products direct to clients [Doherty et al, 2003; de Kare-Silver, 2000].   
 
Electronic commerce is particularly vulnerable to network related threats, such as 
‘unauthorised access by outsiders’ and ‘virus infection and disruptive software’ [DTI 2004]. 
Consequently, it is very likely that the introduction of a significant e-commerce operation, 
within a manufacturing organization, will have significant implications for the management of 
corporate information, and in particular the safeguarding of its security.  One of the key 
concerns here is that the organization will be linking itself electronically to its customers, 
involving increased external e-mail and other Internet-based traffic, leading to the possibility 
of higher levels of virus and worm attacks, hacking incidents, and various denial of service 
attacks than were noted in the previous cases.  In turn, this means that the organization 
needs to ensure that it has adequate contingency and recovery plans in place, including 
alternative arrangements for customers to place orders when the web-based service is out of 
action, and so on.  Indeed, the DTI survey [2004] found that interruptions to the availability of 
services was a major problem for many UK businesses, with some organisations suffering a 
‘very major disruption to their business operations for more than a month'.  A plan for the 
introduction of a comprehensive, web-based facility might highlight security concerns of such 
a magnitude, that it is necessary to amend the plan. For example, the introduction of on-line 
order tracking, which would entail giving customers access to organisational systems, might 
be judged to be too risky, as it would expose the organisation to unacceptable security risks 
from hackers.   
 
Putting ISP into SISP [C & S, 2006.doc; Repository Copy] 12 
Table 1: The impact of Strategic Initiatives on Information Security Policy 
Case examples 
Policy components 
Internet 
access for 
R&D Dept. 
Laptops for 
sales team 
Introduction 
of ERP  
E-commerce 
project 
Personal usage of 
information systems 
XX XXX X X 
Disclosure of information 
 
 X XX XXX 
Physical security of 
infrastructure and information  
 XX XX XX 
Violations and breaches of 
security 
X X XX XXX 
Prevention of viruses and 
worms 
XX XX X XXX 
User access management 
 
X XX XX X 
Mobile computing 
 
 XXX   
Internet access 
 
XXX XXX   
Software development and 
maintenance 
  XX XX 
Encryption 
 
 X XX XXX 
Contingency / continuity 
planning 
  XXX XXX 
Key: X limited impact; XX moderate impact ; XXX highly significant impact 
 
The evidence presented in this section is that there is a very strong rationale for reviewing 
the information security policy in tandem with the formulation of a plan for a significant new, 
strategic initiative, regardless of the size and scope of that initiative.  Table 1 provides a 
summary of each of the illustrative IT projects, reviewed previously, highlighting the 
components of the information security policy, which are likely to be most significantly 
affected by its introduction: the more significant the potential impact, with regard to a specific 
policy component, then the more thoroughly that component will need to be reviewed. The 
table highlights the fact that as the IT initiatives increase in complexity, particularly in terms of 
their impacts both within the organization, and beyond the organization to trading partners, 
the greater the impact on the information security policy and the greater the number of policy 
components requiring evaluation and possible amendment. It also demonstrates that the 
security concerns vary greatly between the initiatives and therefore the security implications 
of each and every new strategy must be judged on its own specific characteristics. 
 
4 Discussion 
Unfortunately, it has often been observed that the high levels of security breaches 
experienced by commercial organisations – as discussed in this paper’s introduction - are 
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failing to raise the organisational profile of information security management. As Straub & 
Welke [1998: 441] note:  
‘Information security continues to be ignored by top managers, middle managers, 
and employees alike. The result of this unfortunate neglect is that organizational 
systems are far less secure than they might otherwise be and that security 
breaches are far more frequent and damaging than is necessary’. 
We would argue that the explicit alignment of the information security policy with the strategic 
information systems plan might be one constructive way of making information security more 
relevant and meaningful to managers, which in turn might help to reduce the incidence and 
severity of security breaches. In adopting this approach organisations can move from a 
reactive style of security management to a far more proactive one. More specifically, it is 
envisaged that the alignment of these two important strategic documents might deliver the 
following six benefits: 
1. The recent DTI [2004] report concluded that ‘all too often, an organisation's security 
policy is out of step with the current business priorities’. The explicit alignment of the 
SISP formulation, and the InSPy creation review, processes will help to give the security 
policy a far stronger business orientation.  
2. The information security policy can be modified in advance of a new strategic 
information systems initiative to ensure that its implementation does not create any new 
and unexpected security risks. 
3. A ‘proactive security culture’ is unfortunately very rare [May, 2003; p. 11], with the 
consequence that the InSPy is typically updated in response to security breaches, or 
technological changes. The integrated approach will allow the InSPy to be modified in a 
more proactive manner, and in so doing shift the emphasis from rectification, to 
prevention. 
4. Prior to its implementation, the strategic information systems plan can be reviewed and 
modified – from a security perspective - to avoid the introduction of any information 
systems / technology initiatives that would be open to significant information security 
risks. 
5. By reviewing the strategic information systems plan and the information security policy 
in parallel it will be possible to flag-up important security controls that need to be built 
into new systems that have been identified in the information system plan, in advance of 
their development. In a similar vein, it will also be possible to incorporate security 
management issues into user manuals, training documentation and procedures prior to 
the introduction of new systems. 
6. It has long been recognized that the real threat from security breaches lies in their 
consequential impact on organizational performance, such as damage to customer 
confidence or a loss in sales revenues [e.g. Menzies, 1993]. By integrating the InSPy 
review into information systems planning, which is a business oriented exercise, it 
should be possible to raise managers’ awareness of the consequential impacts of 
security breaches and to consider how they can best be countered through the InSPy. 
In terms of the limitations of the proposed approach, the key deficiency, at present, is that 
our proposals are purely theoretical. Consequently, we need to test our proposal in practice 
and gain insights from any organisations that have already investigated integrating their 
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InSPys into their information systems planning process. We also need to develop a deeper 
understanding of exactly how the link between the strategic information systems plan and the 
information security policy might best be operationalised. Moreover, it will be important to 
also explore whether there may be any alternative approaches to the alignment of the InSPy 
with corporate objectives. Follow-up research projects, adopting an action research 
approach, are currently being planned to help fill these gaps in our knowledge. 
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
A recent piece of research [Watson, 2004] suggests that the security of IT systems is the 
most stressing problem facing IT Directors. It is envisaged that the explicit integration of the 
InSPy review into the strategic information systems planning process, might provide IT 
Directors with a powerful and effective new approach to improving the security of their 
systems. In so doing, it should help to ensure that the information security policy is not ‘an IT 
document designed by IT in isolation from the business’ [Hinde, 2002; p.315]. When 
reviewing our proposals, however, it must, be remembered that that this is an exploratory 
piece of research designed, at this stage, to prompt a debate rather than to provide any 
complete answers. 
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